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1. Introduction
In this analysis, we examine dynamic capabilities in a distrib-
uted governance system. This perspective is distinct as it breaks
from the dynamic capabilities' association with the firm as the
primary agent. We apply this concept of distributed dynamic ca-
pabilities to three case studies on innovation in South Africa's
mineral industries spanning 100 years. Our analysis shows dynamic
capabilities provide an important analytical lens to understanding
the role of mineral resource-based economic development. It also
suggests a distributed dynamic capabilities approach may offer
significant insights about technology-based competitive advan-
tages under collectively coordinated environments.
The importance of mining-finance groups to South Africa's
economic development is well established.1 Those conglomerates
brought diverse capabilities together to build a range of vertically
and horizontally integrated businesses. Beginning in the 1980's,
South Africa reflected on its economic development legacy as it
began a transition to democratic rule [28]. In that context, there
arose increasing recognition that beyond the mining-finance
groups there existed a distinct coordination system built around
its mineral industries, but spanning agents across the State and
private sector.2 However, those perspectives tended to focus on its
features as a system of accumulation rather than a feature of
higher-level organizational coherence. In this analysis, we view
that network, which spans the mining-finance groups, State-
owned mineral-based enterprises, and parts of the State itself as
forming a unique collectively coordinated governance structure,3
which we call South Africa's mineral resource-finance network
(MRFN). Owing to the long history of mineral industries in South
Africa's economic developmentwe can explore the evolution of this
network's distributed dynamic capabilities across three cases
where critical new technologies and market capabilities were
developed during a century.
Distributed dynamic capabilities in South Africa's MRFN thereby
provides a useful context to reflect on the nature of the organiza-
tion within the dynamic capabilities approach more generally.
Examining a dynamic collaborative capability within a collectively
governed networked organization distinguishes this analysis from
others in the literature where collaboration has been viewed as
means to combine resources across organizational boundaries,4
rather than create them within the organization. Through each
case study we provide evidence that the high-level collaboration
generated from the MRFN meets the criteria of a dynamic capa-
bility. As such, the dynamic capabilities approach is held to provide
important insights about the pattern of economic growth where
resource-based sectors create opportunities for learning in pro-
duction of some goods and services rather than others.5
The remainder of this analysis is set out as follows, after elab-
orating on our analytical approach we turn to the first case study
which examines the emergence of distributed dynamic capabilities
on the kimberlite diamond pipes at Kimberley. The paper then
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1 See for example: [29,46].
2 Bill Freund provides historical context for this approach [28], which includes
Hobart Houghton’s conceptualization of a mineral revolution akin toW.W. Rostow's
modernization paradigm [43,45,80], through Martin Legassick’s analysis gold
mining in the labor control system [55], and on to Fine and Rustomjee’s concept of
the Minerals Energy Complex (MEC) [24].
3 In this regard, we follow Walter Powell in holding collective coordination as a
third dimension to the market-hierarchy continuum [74]. However, we adopt
Streeck and Schmitter’s andHamilton and Feenstra’s perspective and assume col-
lective governance dominates [87,31], but coexists with market and hierarchical
coordination rather than excluding them.
4 See for example [2,3,60,68,71].
5 The distinct opportunities that certain industries afford is a focus of the product
space literature, [34e37,40]. For a contemporary application of this approach in
South Africa see: [33,38].
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traces how those capabilities evolved to create the technology
needed to exploit the vast gold resources discovered on the Wit-
watersrand gold fields. The final case study describes how distrib-
uted dynamic capabilities facilitated the adaptation and transfer of
technologies alongwith an innovative financial structure to create a
uniquely South African oil-from-coal technology. Implications in
terms of the dynamic capabilities approach and South Africa's
mineral-resourced based economic growth are then reviewed in
the conclusion.
2. Analytical approach
Dynamic capabilities is fundamentally associated with Coase's
notion of the firm as the primary and efficient agent [14]. This is
clear throughout most of the literature where a dynamic capability
is defined as the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments [92,93,90]. Nonetheless, we contend that it is
appropriately applied to a collectively governed network organi-
zation as well. These “distributed dynamic capabilities” as we call
them retain the fundamental features of dynamic capabilities.
Teece et al. highlight that dynamic capabilities were conceptu-
alized to explainwhat type of strategic management is needed for a
firm to achieve and sustain competitive advantage [93]. Dynamic
capabilities differentiate firms with the ability to survive and
compete in periods of rapid and disruptive change from those firms
that lose competitive advantage in those environments. As such,
dynamic capabilities refer to the capacity of an organization to
purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base in the face
of strong uncertainty. These are distinct from an organization's
operational capabilities, which pertain to the current operations of
an organization [39]. An environment of rapid and disruptive
change is therefore a necessary condition for application of the
dynamic capabilities approach. Therefore, each of our case studies
begins with a subsection describing the rapid disruptive change, or
deep uncertainty, it involves.
Organizational agility and strategy are key to the application of
dynamic capabilities [90]. This combination of agility and strategy
holds equally true in our analysis of the application of distributed
dynamic capabilities, except that rather than residing in a firm the
capabilities reside across the South African MRFN. Our case study
methodology provides context that establishes the complex and
systematic nature of distributed dynamic capabilities. In describing
these in each case study, emphasis is given to their extraordinary
nature and how they are distinct from ordinary capabilities that
would perpetuate relatively static operating environments. In so
doing we provide evidence that these distributed dynamic capa-
bilities are akin to dynamic capabilities in the firm and are more
than just ad hoc adjustments in the face of uncertainty with a
favorable competitive outcome [21,110].
The historical structure of our case study approach also allows
us to examine the socioeconomic process of these capabilities'
development and change. In so doing our cases aspire to support
Wadhwani and Jones’ call to apply historical research to better
frame understanding about the relationship between capabilities'
development and the process of dynamic change [104]. Therefore,
we conclude each of our case studies with a subsection devoted to
an examination of the evolution of the distributed dynamic
capabilities.
3. The kimberlite diamond pipes
3.1. Deep uncertainty in the Kimberley diamond fields
The pursuit of mineral wealth has been an important force in
European exploration and international economic expansion over
the past 500 years [65]. In southern Africa, the first significant
mineral rush occurred in the 1850 s at the Namaqualand copper
deposits, but the legacy of those deposits wasmuted [85]. It was not
until the late-1860s when the Kimberley diamond fields were
developed that an enduring Southern Africa's mineral-finance
network emerged with distributed dynamic capabilities that facil-
itated broader economic development impacts. While there were
an array of benefits and threats to Kimberley's establishment, the
most important were associated with challenges to attract invest-
ment capital that could transform the diamond deposits' owner-
ship structure and thereby the diamond industry's value chain.
In 1866, the ‘Eureka’ diamond was discovered on the banks of
the Orange River. Despite initial skepticism about the geology of the
deposits, further discoveries led to a full-scale rush for alluvial di-
amonds by 1869. These alluvial diggings were typically mined by a
claim holder and assisted by local Africans in the digging and
sorting of the diamond bearing soil. The alluvial deposits were
quickly cleared and late in 1870 activity at the alluvial diggings
rapidly declined.
However, early in 1870 the first non-alluvial igneous diamond
pipes were discovered.6 Diamond pipes are volcanic conduits that
transport geologic material from deep in the earth to the surface.
The discovery of these igneous diamond deposits around Kimberly
marked an entirely new era of diamond mining. By 1871 mining on
the ‘dry-diggings’ centered around four diamond pipes: Kimberley,
DeBeers, Bultfontein, and Dutoitspan. The diamond deposits from
these four pipes varied, but together their quantity and quality
dramatically increased and transformed the international supply of
diamonds. Previously, diamonds had been the purview of royalty
and the extremely wealthy, but with the emergent supply of di-
amonds from the Kimberley deposits the potential to own one of
these gems expanded dramatically [12, 29,66,107].
The diamond bearing pipes were relatively small although they
continued to substantial depths. In 1872, the combined area mined
at the Kimberley and DeBeers pipes encompassed 12.8 hectare (ha),
6 ha at Dutoitspan and 3.2 ha at Bultfontein. Given this small area
and great quantity of diamonds, it became apparent early on that if
mining operations were consolidated, the diamond miners' influ-
ence over the diamond industry's value chain would be greatly
strengthened. If consolidation was realized, the largest potential
losers were the European diamond merchants. However, there
were several challenges facing a consolidation of diamond mining
on the Kimberley fields. The claim ownership structure inherited
from the alluvial deposits meant that initially each claim was just
2.9 squaremeters, only individuals could own a claim, no individual
could own more than two claims and the owner forfeited their
claim if it was inactive for eight consecutive days. These restrictions
and the geology of the deposits quickly led to a situation where
many individuals were mining a small area to greater and greater
depths [107]). By the mid-1870s production problems were
occurring at all four pipes because of the general depth and
retention of single claims as the unit of production. The multitude
of distinct and increasingly deep mining operations on the Kim-
berley pipe were originally accessed by an elaborate roadway
scaffolding, but by 1872 their collapse in places necessitated
replacement by a haulage systemwith wires emanating in a spider
like fashion to the edge of the pit which is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In addition to just accessing their claim, the small nature and
6 This diamond bearing igneous rock is called kimberlite after the city of Kim-
berley, which formed in the early 1870s around the mines. Currently, kimberlite is
the main source of diamonds, but only a minority of kimberlite pipes bear di-
amonds, and only a fraction of those are economic enough to mine.
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increasing depth of mining on the pipes created externalities that
required collective action. The intercepting of groundwater and rain
created an increasing need for pumping water out of the mines, but
the potential to free-ride on an individual miner's water extraction
was significant. Another considerable force supporting collective
action came from rock falls and wall failures. As depths grew
greater, and when mining of one claim progressed much more
rapidly than a nearby claim, the threat and actual collapse of some
part of the mine emerged. Once a fall occurred clearing the debris
and potentially supporting areas to prevent further failures thereby
required collective action. Mining boards were established to pro-
vide these services but they were also used to exert authority for
consolidation.
Kimberley diamond mining thereby faced a tremendous chal-
lenge as coordinatedmining and provision of public goods required
cooperation that was difficult to achieve without consolidated
ownership. The growing constraint of these technological and
organizational challenges along with labor and capital shortages
and conflicts over property rights ended an era individual devel-
opment that was reflected in an outflow of residents. In 1872
Kimberley's population was more than 14,000, but by the end of
1874 it was only 7,000 [111]. There were strong incentives to free-
ride and/or undercut actions to reduce or constrain the supply of
diamonds owing to the large-scale nature of the diamond deposits.
It was difficult to form coalitions with the legacy of small claims
across the pipes. Adding further difficulty were several waves of
speculative investments which increased uncertainty and risk to
investors whose financial capital was needed to consolidate
ownership. Therefore, as the deposits expanded global supply of
diamonds, they simultaneously created inherent challenges for
producers. While the eventual consolidation of ownership seemed
inevitable, the nature of that consolidation was far from certain.7
3.2. Distributed dynamic capabilities in the Kimberley diamond
fields
Some initial relief on these production and ownership chal-
lenges came in 1873, when the maximum number of claims an
individual could own rose from two to ten, but it was only after the
black flag revolt of 1875 and the significant labor and organizational
change that followed when claim ownership restrictions were
removed late in 1876 that significant consolidation began to occur
[96]. Relaxation of claim ownership restrictions initiated a new era
of corporate ownership and production on the diamond fields. This
consolidation generally increased the capital intensity of
production with an introduction of mechanical equipment that
required increasingly skilled workers. Migrant European, mainly
British, miners were needed to operate and maintain this equip-
ment and so a new class of skilled labor began work on the dia-
mond fields. The new methods of production restored profitability
to many operations, but economies in production led to a race to
secure ever larger claims on all of the pipes. The further relaxation
of claim ownership restrictions in 1876 led to reinstating of mining
boards with a structure favorable to larger operations [67]. The
services controlled by the mining board, such as pumping of water
from the pits and clearing collapsed areas of the pit made them
increasingly important forces over the various claim's competi-
tiveness especially as the pits grew deeper. The lack of influence
over the mining boards and productive economies of scale put
smaller claim holders in a position of accelerating disadvantage
compared to larger operations.
Technical knowledge gained from leading producers at Kim-
berley created a unique distributed dynamic capability in collabo-
rative innovation. The Kimberley diamond pipe was often the first
to encounter technical challenges and develop solutions. These
solutions were incorporated into operations at the other diamond
pipes enabling them catch-up with the leading-edge producers
from Kimberley [107]. This structure of local knowledge external-
ities enhanced productivity across the Kimberly diamond fields, but
Newbury argues that it also gave a productive advantage to intra-
industry rivals at the DeBeers pipe and played a significant role in
shaping the eventual consolidation of the entire Kimberley dia-
mond industry [67]. The distributed ownership structure of the
mines was an important precondition for this collective innovation
[1]. Other prerequisites for collective innovation include risk and
uncertainty regarding scientific understanding, which the unique
and unprecedented nature of the kimberlite deposits certainly
fulfils, as well as independent agents circulating and diffusing
know-how, which autonomous mining engineers working on the
Kimberley fields satisfied.
By the early 1880s, the greaterwealth of deposits at the De Beers
and Kimberley pipes meant unification of control at either of them
would effectively enable consolidation at the other two pipes and
monopolize global production of diamonds. Hence, an urgency
characterized efforts to control both of these central pipes. While
the processes of unification at the Kimberley and DeBeers pipes
where unique, they had by that stage unified their commitment to a
compound system to manage migrant labor and systematic
exploitation of the diamond deposits.
In this intermediate era of corporate production, smaller com-
panies were largely eliminated and a few companies controlled
operations at each pipe. However, consolidation remained incom-
plete and the remaining companies were perpetuating the pro-
ductive difficulties of diversified ownership at a larger scale. At both
the Kimberley and De Beers pipes, the two companies at the fore-
front of ownership consolidation were the two companies with the
greatest influence on the mining boards. Respectively, these firms
were the DeBeers Diamond Corporation and the Kimberley Central
Diamond Corporation. While DeBeers Diamond Corporation would
eventually consolidate ownership in 1888, distributed dynamic
capabilities from diamond mining at Kimberley were already being
transferred to the goldmining industry on theWitwatersrand [111].
Those distributed dynamic capabilities were transferred to the
Witwatersrand across what had become a coherent MRFN. The
foreign capital investments that facilitated consolidation were
drawn together from established networks and production rela-
tionship built primarily around the diamond industry, but unique in
their focus on building sustained control over diamond mining in
the Southern African interior. The mining ownership networks that
were established were also unprecedented and built a productive
Fig. 1. Rope and Haul system at the Kimberley diamond pipe.
7 See, for example, [67,81,96,105,111].
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mineral resource industry founded on the need for collective action
and coordination. Related to that familiarity of operations was
simultaneous competition and coordination, such as the use of
learning around diamond mining practices to facilitate consolida-
tion of ownership. It also supported the open system of innovation
in mining practices, and with its further development on the Wit-
watersrand goldfields it initiated a collaborative system of inno-
vation within the mining industry that would endure for decades.
3.3. The emergence of the MRFN and its distributed dynamic
capabilities at Kimberley
The MRFN's distributed dynamic capabilities that were estab-
lished on the Kimberley diamond fields thereby led to notable
economic development which defined the centrality of the mineral
resource economy in South Africa. Many precedents were impor-
tant to establishment of the MRFN at Kimberley. The diamond
merchant business networks that predated the discovery of the
kimberlite deposits exerted the strongest influence. The elastic
nature of market demand meant that these merchants would be
strongly affected if they left production of diamonds to the vagaries
of speculative boom and bust production. Consolidated mining of
the Kimberley deposits was necessary for them to retain the value
of their processing and selling. This meant that there was an
inherent interest in coordinating production early in the industry's
development that was distinct from theworldwide preciousmetals
booming mining camps with their more inelastic demand
structures.
Colonial and state focused interests in development of the fiscal
benefits from the mines were another established, but important
influence over the development of mining activities at Kimberley
[23,66]. These development focused coalitions, would be trans-
ferred via the MRFN to the Witwatersrand and entrench the cen-
trality of the mineral resource economy in South Africa. The MRFN
also created a critical foundation to support labor controls, which
facilitated labor supply for the mines. While Africans had been
selling labor to whites before Kimberley, the orchestrated labor
power struggle facilitated by diamond producers among white-
black and skilled-unskilled workers on the kimberlite diamond
mines established precedents that would be followed on the Wit-
watersrand [47,48,84,86]. Distinct, but interrelated to these were
the influence of colonial ambitions and settlers' advance into the
African hinterland which impacted the racial characteristics of
production. These were inherited from the early Dutch settlement
of the Cape, but evolved with further European, and particularly
Trekboer expansion into central Southern Africa [7].
It is significant that constraints on sovereignty of indigenous
workers followed an initial considerable economic advance of Af-
rican communities responding to demand for goods and services.
They were central in the early development of Kimberley providing
transportation services and agricultural products [7]. The state-
mining partnership built on the Kimberley diamond fields and
embodied in the MRFN was also instrumental to the development
of the hut taxes and pass regulations to limit the mobility of labor
and subjugate African societies.
Consolidation of ownership at Kimberley was also associated
with decline in that community's economic importance. In essence,
while ownership of the diamond fields entered final consolidation
local commercial interests faced reduced market opportunities as
the Kimberley mining interests: 1) constrained production of di-
amonds to protect their value and support demand from diamonds,
2) increase efficiencies through labor replacing capital investment
in underground mining operations, and 3) creating an isolated Af-
rican migrant labor force removed from local commercial interest
through their accommodation in mining compounds. Using
interests of the Afrikaner Bond to leverage their positions Kim-
berley mining interests supported the development of domestic
agriculture through import duties and thereby, along with a coa-
lition of large wholesalers and merchants who profitably supplied
African labor in the mining compounds, removed opposition from
the small merchants at Kimberley.8 Hence, a slow process at Kim-
berley began gradually devolving the community into a company
town with limited economic development impacts. Somewhat
ironically, the firm that eventually consolidated the diamond field,
DeBeers Consolidated, financed the railway line to Johannesburg
which effectively bypassed Kimberley's commercial links with the
Witwatersrand.
4. The Witwatersrand goldfield
4.1. Deep uncertainty in the Witwatersrand goldfields
Surface gold deposits had been discovered by prospectors in the
Southern African interior as far back as the early 1850s. However, it
was not until 1873 when the region experienced its first ‘gold rush’.
This occurred in the Blyde River watershed and, as with many
subsequent gold rushes in the region; initial small-scale alluvial
mining operations gave way to more organized mining and
extraction operations. During this era, after initial development
gold extraction was achieved with an established technology,
amalgamation, a process dating back hundreds of years and
possibly back to the Roman Empire [44].
In the amalgamation process the gold bearing host rock is
crushed and ground into fine sand like material. Water is then
added to produce a ‘pulp’, which is a gold bearing muddy sub-
stance. The pulp is then passed over mercury where gold sinks into
the mercury because of its higher specific gravity. Lighter minerals
in the pulp cannot sink through the mercury and become waste
tailings. After concentration through amalgamation, the gold
amalgam enters a pyro-metallurgical stage to separate the mercury
and gold. That process heats the gold laden mercury for several
hours boiling and vaporizing the mercury, and leaving sponge gold.
A significant, albeit incremental improvement, to the amalgam-
ation process occurred with the California gold rush of 1849, when
amalgamated copper plates were introduced facilitating greater
industrialization of the gold extraction technology [11].
Mining of the Witwatersrand began in 1886 on the surface or
‘outcropped’ gold deposits. During this initial period of develop-
ment milling facilities and amalgamation plants rapidly emerged to
support the growing operations [106]. In the outcropping zone,
gold recovery with the amalgamation process was around 75 to
80%, but as mining moved deeper underground recovery rates
declined. Following the gold bearing host rock deeper under-
ground, the amount of elemental gold decreased as outside of the
oxidized zone it increasingly combined with sulphide. In addition,
pressure at increasing depths reduced the size of the gold particles.
Together, these influences reduced the efficiency of the amalgam-
ation process. In the latter part of 1889 several of the deeper mines
began to intercept the sulphide zone and with that geological
transition recovery with amalgamation declined to about 60% of
the gold, putting significant strain on the economic viability of
mining.
As word of the declining yields at depth spread, investors in this
fledgling industry began to worry that their investments would be
lost and began selling their interests. This had a compounding ef-
fect and sparked a massive sell-off of mining interest on the
8 The simultaneous growth of the Witwatersrand at this time also helped dilute
opposition.
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Witwatersrand. The speculative bubble burst; by early 1890, the
market value of the mines plummeted 70%, and a third of Johan-
nesburg's population departed [20]. Hence, early in 1890 the future
of mining on the Witwatersrand seemed questionable unless
technical breakthroughs were achieved and the settlement,
Johannesburg, built to support the extraction was considered by
many destined to become yet another ghost town after a mining
boom [32,78]. Survival of the Witwatersrand goldfields hinged on
the development of a viable metallurgical process to extract gold
from the deposits in the sulphide zone.
In the later-19th century the constraint to the amalgamation
process was not unique to the Witwatersrand; limits in the
extractive ability of the amalgamation process limited the eco-
nomic viability of gold deposits around the world. In 1890, faced
with the need for an alternative extraction technology there were
two principal processes: chlorine-based extraction and cyanide-
based extraction. The chlorine-based process was relatively estab-
lished technology at that point. The process was first developed to
treat gold in 1848 by C F. Plattner at the Royal Freiberg Smelting
Works in Germany [79]. By the early 1860s, the Plattner chlorine
process had been applied on gold deposits at Schemnitz (Banska
Stiavnica) in Slovakia, Reichenstein (Zloty Stok) in Poland, and at
mines in California and Nevada in the United States [17, 53, 95].
Further adoption of the chlorination process occurred globally
during the 1870s and in the mid-1880s Australian based Claude
Theodore James Vautin and James Cosmo Newbery enhanced the
process by introducing compressed air in the dissolution of gold
and employing charcoal for its precipitation [6].
Despite adoption of chlorine based extraction there were some
fundamental challenges. In the chlorination process gold is liber-
ated from the sulphides after crushing by roasting and then using
the chlorine to adhere to the gold. The effectiveness of the process
varied considerably from deposit to deposit and by the chemical
skill of the metallurgist. Certain elements in the deposits would
also absorb chlorine and thus increase associated costs as the
amount of chlorine required to extract the gold increased. Particles
around the gold, particularly smaller gold at depths, would also
prevent chlorination. In addition, once in solution chemical pro-
cesses could cause the gold to be precipitated in the tailings before
filtration was complete. Where chlorination had been established,
particularly in Australia, solutions to these challenges had been
developed by local metallurgists that made the process economi-
cally viable and institutionally difficult to displace with other
technology [94].
Chlorine-based extraction was thereby well-positioned to
address the challenges of sulphide ores found on the Witwa-
tersrand. Hence, chlorination was employed as a solution. The first
chlorination plant was built on the Witwatersrand in 1890 using
the Newbery-Vautin process, then in 1891 chlorination plants were
also opened at the Simmer & Jack and Robinson Mines. These
plants, despite the significant investments made, could not
compete with the developing cyanide-based technology and by
1902 there were no longer any chlorination plants operating on the
Witwatersrand [109].
Cyanide's ability to dissolve gold had been documented in
Prussia as far back as the 18th century and the solubility of gold and
silver in cyanide solutions had been noted in a British patent by J.R.
and H. Elkington in 1840. In commercial mining, Henry Wurtz had
noted in 1866 that cyanide was being used on some goldfields as
part of the amalgamation process, but not as an extraction process
itself. Several processes to use cyanide for the extraction of gold
were experimented with over the ensuing decades until the mid-
1880s, most being laboratory experiments or niche applications
[13].
In 1886, John S. MacArthur and the Forrest Brothers in Glasgow
developed an industrial process of cyanide extraction. Commer-
cialization of the technology began the same year when the Cassel
gold recovery corporation was formed as a partnership of Mac-
Arthur and the Forrest Brothers [59]. In 1887, the Cassel/Forrest
process was marketing itself as a gold extraction technology, but
the first application of the cyanide process was in 1888 at a pilot
plant in Ravenswood, Queensland Australia. Subsequently, the
process was applied on a commercial basis for the first time in 1889
on a gold mine at Karangahake near Auckland, New Zealand
[13,63].
4.2. Distributed dynamic capabilities in the Witwatersrand
goldfields
The challenges in developing a viable metallurgical process for
the massive quantity of deep level gold deposits led the Witwa-
tersrand's system of innovation to develop critical technological
leadership in cyanide-based extraction of gold. Supported by the
legacy of Kimberley's open innovation precedents, incremental
technological innovations and information diffusion propelled
development of the cyanide process from pilot technology to a
robust industrialized method of gold extraction by the end of the
1890s. Not only would cyanide-based extraction prove a durable
technology, its open community of practitioners entrenched an
enduring practice of collaboration in critical competitive technol-
ogies for the industry [5].
The real driver of the process' applicationwould come in May of
1890 when the process was tested on a pilot plant at the Salisbury
mine on the Witwatersrand [58]. Strong results from that experi-
ment greatly encouraged stakeholders in the Witwatersrand mines
who were desperate for a solution to sulphide layer challenges.
MacArthur's Cassel Company operated the first pilot plant on the
Witwatersrand in June 1890 at the Salisbury Mine. After favorable
results, a local company, the African Gold Recovery Syndicate
(AGRS), was granted license over process patents. At the Robinson
mine in December 1890, the AGRS opened the first commercial
plant to use the cyanide process. With successful operation, the
Robinson mine took over the plant from AGRS when their lease
expired in June 1891. Several other commercial plants would
rapidly be established as the cyanide process proved itself an
effective, economic, and robust technology for treating the Wit-
watersrand's gold [9,26].
As with other incidences of collaborative innovation, several key
preconditions supported the system in the development of the
cyanide-based extraction technology. The distributed ownership
structure predisposed interests in a solution to the challenge. The
technology was also uncertain and subject to limited scientific
understanding. Collaborative innovation worked to reduce some of
the uncertainty associated with those investments and thereby
facilitated the financial networks to leverage further investments to
develop this industrialized process for extracting the gold bearing
deposits from the sulphide zone. The independent metallurgical
experts were the final critical component who acted to diffuse
learning and best practices about the technology as similar agents
had done at Kimberley and in other instances of collective
innovation.9
In fact, in large measure because of the mobility of these met-
allurgists and the open nature of their innovation system, the cy-
anide process rapidly spread beyond the Witwatersrand goldfields.
In 1890, the process was also applied at a gold mine in Colorado
[88]. In 1891 gold mines at Mercury in Utah, and Calmed in Cali-
fornia established cyanide-based gold extraction plants. This was
9 For descriptions of other instances of collective innovation see: [1,62,69,103].
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followed by its application in Tuscarora, Nevada in 1892 and at
Bodie in California in 1894 [72]. Despite this spread of the process
theWitwatersrand became a critical center for the industrialization
of the process and thereby its broader application.
The cyanide process was not a South African technology; it drew
on global expertise and practices. However, South Africa estab-
lished technological leadership in the process globally relying on an
open source approach to knowledge not so unlike open source
sharing today. Using an open innovation system, the evolving
challenges to the cyanide process were met with significant con-
tributions coming from South African expertise. A method for the
economic treatment of gold bearing slimematerial and innovations
to the zinc based method of gold precipitation were two key
challenges to the cyanide process' adoption in the early years that
were successfully addressed with significant contributions from
South Africa's nascent leadership in the technology.10 While this
does not imply that the cyanide process was a South Africa tech-
nology, the analysis demonstrates that the industrialization of the
process uniquely benefited from the Witwatersrand gold mining
industry.
4.3. Evolution of MRFN and its distributed dynamic capabilities on
the Witwatersrand
On theWitwatersrand goldfields, the MRFN continued to evolve
from its emergence at the Kimberley diamond fields. In this case,
we showed its distributed dynamic capabilities led to development
of an economic extractive technology to access theWitwatersrand's
vast gold deposits. A distributed mining-finance group ownership/
management structure continued to characterize organizations
that were part of the MRFN [22,24,57,70]. Similarly, the network's
broadly coordinated production among mining companies facili-
tated collaborative innovation like it had at Kimberley, but with
more prominence in resolving the uncertainty that faced the Wit-
watersrand compared to that at Kimberley. Underpinning these
were financial networks and social capital linkages across the en-
terprises which facilitated investment in the innovative extraction
system like it had facilitated consolidation in ownership across the
kimberlite deposits.
Perhaps one of the more important relationships built-on and
developed from the Kimberley diamond fields were the MRFN's
state and capital coalitions. The Kimberley diamonds fields were
entering into consolidation as the Witwatersrand gold deposits
were discovered. As such, leveraging state support to facilitate
favorable operating conditions was important and so it was trans-
ferred directly to the Witwatersrand. Perhaps, most significant in
this regard was the use of state support by industry interests to
facilitate co-opting African labor. Further labor restrictions, work-
force transportation infrastructure, and pecuniary charges
compelled increasing numbers of Africans to work on the mines at
the same time limiting alternative employment opportunities
[47,48,112].
These actions, and the strength of the state-capital alliance,
reduced some of the risks (known unknown) associated with the
Witwatersrand gold mines and thereby made the investments in
and development of the cyanide extraction technology possible,
despite the lingering deep uncertainty (unknown unknowns).11 The
MRFN was also instrumental in directing broader industrial
development just as it had been on the Kimberley fields [27]. As
such the Witwatersrand drew-on and developed the network's
social capital, colonial and ethnic identities in its influence over the
structure of ownership and financial positions of mining companies
[73].
In contrast to Kimberley, the certainty that the cyanide process
provided for accessing the Witwatersrand's gold resources and
growing confidence in the MRFN's development path combined to
lead the large mining-finance groups to undertake significant in-
vestments in industrialization. These occurred in Johannesburg and
other communities surrounding the Witwatersrand and ranged
from the manufacture of mining equipment through, housing de-
velopments, agriculture and food processing industries, as well as
electricity and water utilities. In addition to these industries, the
MRFN also facilitated domestic development of ever-growing
mineral resource capabilities which included production of explo-
sives and industrial chemicals as well as iron, steel, and many
others including coal and its beneficiation.
5. The South African synthetic fuels industry
5.1. Deep uncertainty in the synfuels industry
The evolution of South Africa's oil-from-coal industry was sha-
ped by the nature of available coal deposits. South African coal is
characterized by high ash content, much more so than is found in
more northern deposits. This ash, or inorganic material, is mixed
with hydrocarbons and complicates the process of liquefaction.
Fundamentally, coal must be hydrogenated to transform to fuels
and ash is generally a contaminant.
There are two primary approaches to liquefaction of coal, direct
and indirect [54]. Direct liquefaction immediately converts coal to
liquid fuels using high temperatures and pressures. Indirect lique-
faction is a two-step process. First coal is gasified, and then hy-
drocarbon molecules are converted to liquid fuels; this has the
advantage of first removing impurities, but is less thermally effi-
cient than direct liquefaction. Both approaches were known in the
1930s when South Africa first became interested in oilefrom-coal.
South Africa selected indirect liquefaction primarily due to the high
ash content of South African coal, which tends to fare poorly under
direct liquefaction.
The technology of indirect liquefaction developed in Europe,
especially Germany. In 1902 two French chemists, P. Sabatier and J.
Senderens catalyzed carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide into
methane at atmospheric pressure. About ten years later, Fritz Haber
synthesized ammonia using high pressure and a catalytic tech-
nique. In 1913, the German firm of Badische Anilim and Soda Fabrik
(BASF) was awarded a patent for catalytic hydrogenation of carbon
monoxide. Shortly afterward, BASF developed technology for the
hydrogenation of carbon monoxide into methanol with high
pressures. This technology came to the attention of Franz Fischer of
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (later to become the Max Planck
Institute). Fischer and colleagues experimented with various reac-
tion possibilities in the 1920's including use of iron shavings as a
catalyst [25]. Motor fuels were first produced from hydrocarbon
gases in 1931 using a cobalt catalyst. The first indirect liquefaction
pilot plant was established in 1933. The technology was turned
over to Ruhrchemie A. G. Oberhousen, a commercial firm. Seven
normal pressure reactors were built in Germany by 1937 as part of
an effort to bolster energy independence prior to WorldWar II. The
largest of these at Scwarzheide, produced 180,000 tons per year
(about 3,615 barrels a day) and was the only indirect facility still
operating at the end of the war [82].
Nazi Germany was more reliant on direct liquefaction, first
patented in Germany by Friedrich Bergius in 1913. Bergius shared
the Nobel Prize in chemistry with Carl Bosch in 1931 in large part
10 See, for example, [8,10,76,102,108].
11 We follow others in the dynamic capabilities literature and adopt the distinc-
tion forwarded by Frank Knight between risk (known unknowns) and uncertainty
(unknown unknowns) [51].
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for this work. Germany embarked on amajor synfuels development
program in 1936 under the direction of Herman Goering. Becker
reported German plans called for a public-private partnership, with
the private sector supplying half of the capital, put at 1.15 billion
marks [4]. By 1943, Germany relied on synfuels for half of its pe-
troleum needs including most aviation fuel. The remainder came
primarily from Romania and domestic supplies, including oil from
annexed Austria. Total production from direct and indirect lique-
faction peaked in early 1944 with an estimated production of
124,000 barrels a day from twenty-five plants [97]. Later, strategic
bombing destroyed much of that capacity [52].
There was considerable interest in German technology in the
United States and South Africa. The United States Congress passed
the Liquid Fuel Act of 1944, which allocated funds to the Bureau of
Mines for pilot synfuels projects [42]. This included direct and in-
direct hydrogenation demonstrations in Missouri [100]. The mili-
tary was also interested in this technology and formed the
Technical Oil Mission, eight specialized units sent to study German
methods and transfer technology as part of occupation forces. The
Allied advance provided access to the petrochemical infrastructure
of Germany's Ruhr Valley. American forces salvaged heat ex-
changers, high pressure injector pumps and other devices. They
also retrieved valuable information in seized files and other re-
cords. The Truman administration favored development of a do-
mestic oil-from-coal industry. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal
recommended an 8 billion dollar synfuels industry to help assure
energy independence in light of rapidly growing demand for pe-
troleum products and rising oil prices. But the oil industry, at first
ambivalent, later opposed synfuels because of high costs. The
transition to the Republican Eisenhower Administration, with a
reluctance to embrace nonmarket approaches, and the stability of
oil prices effectively ended federal efforts to develop synfuels in the
United States for twenty years.
One of the more remarkable aspects of the story of oil-from-coal
development in South Africa is the transfer of state of the art
German technology. Nazi views on race and ethnicity found
considerable sympathy with some elements of South African white
society. The German challenge to British global hegemony was very
much in accord with sentiments of much of the Afrikaans popu-
lation. Memories of the Second Boer War were still alive. The
Ossewabrandwag, formed in the late 1930's, was a paramilitary
organization allied with Germany and in active opposition to South
Africa's Allied war effort [61]. Many Afrikaans leaders were
important members including two future national leaders, John
Vorster (1966e1978) and P.W. Botha (1978e1989). Vorster was
incarcerated during World War II for his association and leadership
in the Ossewabrandwag.
Pro-German sympathies may have played a role in German
technology transfer to South Africa. Yet it was not an Afrikaans
business interest that took possession of synfuels patents, but
rather Anglovaal. Anglovaal was the parent of Satmar (South Afri-
can Torbanite and Mining Company). Satmar was established in
1934 to exploit torbanite, a form of oil shale deposits in South Af-
rica. Anglovaal was aware of developments in Germany and sought
to learn more about what might be appropriate for its markets. An
engineer, Oscar Feldman, was authorized to investigate German
advances. In 1936, Anglovaal sought production rights from Rurh-
chemie and Franz Fischer. A contract was drawn between the two
firms specifying and authorizing key patent transfers. Conditions
for commercial operations were also spelled out, including pro-
duction and marketing rights for southern Africa as far north as
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). Agreements were signed by Fredrick
Martin and Heinz Waibel of Ruhrchemie and Abraham Hersov and
C.H. Leon of Anglovaal. The first agreement was signed on July 25,
1936 at Oberhousen-Holten in Germany. A second agreement was
signed after Anglovaal tested some of the technology. Fig. 2 shows
these patent applications. They range from gasification patents in
1931 to liquid fuel synthesis technology in 1936.
The onset of the war halted construction, agreements were
suspended and afterward Anglovaal allowed its rights to expire. At
this point, most of the technology was held by American and British
interests and there was little expectation that Ruhrchemie could
provide exclusive production and marketing rights.
There remained inherent uncertainty about the economic
viability of the oil-from-coal technology despite advances during
the war. There was no clarity about the extent of the capital cost,
the effectiveness of existing indirect liquefaction technologies with
South African coal, and other concerns. Moreover, post-war
decolonization and growing cold war tensions heightened South
Africa's sense of impending isolation. A national security exter-
nality regarding oil vulnerability was imminent, but there was
much uncertainty about its magnitude and timing. These issues
were beyond Anglovaal's purview and alternative means of devel-
oping the technology were necessary.
5.2. Distributed dynamic capabilities in the synfuels industry
In guiding the South African MRFN's distributed dynamic ca-
pabilities, the experience of German industrial development efforts
provided a new model embracing private production with large-
scale government support. Public concern about international
isolation in the anticolonial post war period was another factor
driving support for establishment of a parastatal organization
responsible for synfuels development. The Liquid Fuel and Oil Act
was passed in 1947. But at this point, South Africa was not isolated
and the internationally respected Boer War veteran, Jan Smuts was
still Prime Minister. The National Party, known for advancing
apartheid, was elected in 1948.
The Liquid Fuel and Oil Act effectively gave Anglovaal what it
would have had with the German agreement, exclusive rights for
synfuels production and marketing. A license for production was
granted in 1949. Provisions of the license stipulated that no coal of
less than 30% ash content could be rejected unless necessary for
mine roof support. This helped assure use of indirect liquefaction. A
new organization, wholly owned by the government's Industrial
Development Corporation took the lead. In 1950 the South African
Coal, Oil and Gas Company, known as South African Synthetic Oil
Limited (Sasol) was established. The first plant, known as Sasol I
along the Vaal River, was constructed at what is now Sasolburg in
the Free State province. The facility employed gasifiers manufac-
tured by Lurgi of Germany and Ruhrchemie was brought back into
the fold as supplier of reactor and catalyst technologies [99].
Additional reactor technology was obtained from the United States
including some for production of motor fuels. American technology
also afforded relatively easier enlargement. Sasol integrated
German and American approaches into the construction of Sasol I,
which began operations in 1955. Financing was provided by the
state's Industrial Development Corporation. Teething problems
plagued production until 1960 [64].
Sasol was developed in the post-World War II era of decoloni-
zation and was a lynchpin in South Africa's “laager” of isolation and
white minority rule. Supported by the MRFN, South Africa was
confident it could establish synfuel production. But this large in-
dustrial undertaking was only possible because of South Africa's
well-established infrastructure and expertise in coal mining and
geo-chemical engineering. The distributed dynamic capabilities
established in Kimberly and developed on the Witwatersrand were
essential building blocks in establishment of this new resource-
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based industry. This legacy included the model of labor relations,
which was later embedded in Sasol's very large underground coal
mines. The heavy-handed role of the public sector, significantly
more so than in diamond or gold mining, providing equity and debt
capital on favorable terms, was a critical and the key subsidy. Other
subsidies were also important including export credits, customs
advantages and an internal subsidy per liter of gasoline sold.
Moreover, transportation barriers favor Sasol's inland market.
Johannesburg is at 1,750 m in elevation. There are significant
transportation costs associated with bringing imported fuel to
market. Sasol production on the high veld affords “natural protec-
tion” that augments economic viability.
While economists commonly argue that coal-based synfuels are
inefficient because costs exceed the opportunity cost of imported
fuels. In the South African case those results are more ambiguous
for several reasons.12 South Africa's purposeful approach to syn-
fuels established an industry with tens of thousands of employees
and an expertise that is part of the global petrol-chemical industry
with Africa as its primary market. Therefore, even if the initial
opportunity costs where not clear, it became an enterprise with an
established competitive advantage.13
5.3. Evolution of the MRFN and its distributed dynamic capabilities
with synfuels
South African MRFN and its various capabilities were well-
developed by the mid-20th century. The progression from di-
amonds in Kimberly to gold on the Witwatersrand provided
infrastructure for mining and related industries. A critical mass of
mining engineers, chemical engineers as well as other professional
and skilled workers provided a technical foundation and confi-
dence for establishment of an oil-from-coal industry. The well-
developed financial sector that evolved with exploitation of dia-
mond and gold resources was another key element in this path
dependent story. Financial institutions were on hand to provide
both debt and equity finance for large-scale industrial un-
dertakings. Most importantly, the post Second Anglo-Boer War era
facilitated South Africa's development of a more centralized and
modern state. The MRFN's distributed dynamic capabilities lever-
aged that centralized and modern state to provide the resources
and leadership necessary to see the synfuel project through to
completion.
The MRFN continued to contribute to the subsequent develop-
ment of the synfuels industry. When the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-
74 singled out Israel, South Africa, the United States and the
Netherlands for oil supply disruptions, the MRFN facilitated the
flow of resources to substantially increase Sasol production. The
first step in this regard was the development of Sasol II, which
began construction in 1974, with the support of financial in-
stitutions, both public and private, and the guarantee of state price
support through retail motor fuel taxes, grants and export credits.
There was a second oil shock in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution in
Iran, which led to the development of Sasol III. It was financed
much the same way as Sasol II, and it again involved the Industrial
Development Corporation, but Sasol III also included equity capital
Fig. 2. Applications for patents in the Union of South Africa.
12 U.S. Dollar pricing of oil and South African Rand weakness is one such reason
[41]. In addition, assumptions of full employment of labor which support the op-
portunity costs of capital argument are questionable in South Africa with its high,
and historically orchestrated, unemployment. Lastly, periods of high liquidity in
South Africa also led to an environment of negative real interest rates raising
further questions about the opportunity costs of capital in this very capital-
intensive endeavor.
13 It is significant that South Africa's competitiveness in resource-based inter-
mediate products, like oil-from-coal, also have large economies of scale which can
insulate them from competition. In South Africa this was particularly true during its
increasing international isolation prior to democratization.
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raised on the Johannesburg stock exchange. TheMRFN's distributed
dynamic capabilities were critical to this development of the larger
indirect coal liquefaction facilities. Both second-generation facil-
ities were constructed to produce 50,000 barrels a day, approxi-
mately ten times the size of the Sasol I facility. Numerous
improvements over Sasol I were also incorporated, including
electronic instrumentation, improved cooling systems and better
catalytic techniques. These facilities were also much more efficient
in water consumption [83]. The impact of Sasol on South African
liquid fuel production has been substantial but it is also important
to note that Sasol generates substantial nonfuel by-products
including feedstock for plastics and high quality industrial waxes.
As a result, the MRFN development path perpetuated with estab-
lishment of Sasol was also important to broader economic devel-
opment. Sasol emerged as the primary producer of gasoline for
most of South Africa's large inland area and diversified into other
branches of chemical production. These other areas included syn-
thetic ammonia and petro-chemical raw materials. The mineral
resource based economy in South Africa was not a sector of limited
knowledge intensity and growth constrained by finite mineral de-
posits. In contrast, it was much more in line with the description of
knowledge-based development.14
6. Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that the concept of ‘distributed dy-
namic capabilities’ facilitates the examination of a host of path
dependent social and economic factors on a distributed organiza-
tion's development. This reconceptualization of the dynamic ca-
pabilities framework from its focus on the firm as the primary agent
to include a network of agents creates a unique analytical tool to
explore the evolution of an economy overtime.15 We explore some
implications in terms of South Africa's historiography in the
remainder of this conclusion, but we also believe it holds significant
promise in managerial science and economic development appli-
cations that are beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Recognizing that a distributed organization is more than the
firms which compose it raises a range of issues regarding the
strategic management of networks that should be explored further.
In addition, distributed dynamic capabilities suggests a useful
approach to examine the organizational structure of economic
development and the features driving the evolution of an econo-
my's product space and comparative advantage. Exploring these
insights, we believe will advance understanding of the process of
technological change in society and society in technological change.
This analysis shows that the microfoundations of a dynamic
path dependent trajectory were established at Kimberley like those
described in the dynamic capabilities approach [91]. There on the
kimberlite diamond fields the MRFN emerged with distributed
dynamic capabilities that directed development of the diamond
industry and facilitated broader economic development across the
Southern African interior.16 We then showed the distributed dy-
namic capabilities of the MRFN were applied to develop an in-
dustrial cyanide based extraction method through a collaborative
effort of mining-finance groups. That technology led to the large-
scale development of the Witwatersrand goldfields and another
round ofmuch broader industrial development across the Southern
African interior. Lastly, we described how the MRFN's distributed
dynamic capabilities led to the development of a domestic oil-
from-coal technology through a partnership between a mining-
finance group and the government. That collaboration led to the
creation of state-owned enterprise and a South African synfuels
industry with further industrial development impacts. While
counterfactuals are by nature speculative, it is reasonable to believe
that a very different domestic mineral industry and economic his-
tory would have developed if the MRFN had not emerged on the
Kimberley diamond deposits without the network's distributed
dynamic capabilities. We believe that our analysis shows that
without the MRFN, the Southern African interior would likely have
been considerably less economically developed. That is not to say
that development of the region's mineral resources would not have
occurred, but that eventual development would have depended
more on foreign technology and not been characterized by lever-
aged industrialization, development of additional mineral re-
sources, and the emergence of other resource-based intermediate
products.
We described how this development path led by the MRFN
involved processes of political and cultural dimensions in the
process of capabilities development. While those were important
to establishing broader South African capabilities in finance, engi-
neering, and chemistry which became features of the South African
economy in their own right, they also created legacies South Afri-
ca's industrial and labor relations systems that institutionalized
racial discrimination. Those racial labor policies were part of the
MRFN's distributed dynamic capabilities that helped solve the deep
uncertainty at one point in time, but overtime theywould become a
fundamental challenge to the MRFN's further operation. As such,
our analysis suggests that it is necessary to reassess the assumption
put forward by Protogerou et al. that dynamic capabilities are
positive on performance [75].
Deepening our understanding about the origins and evolution of
the MRFN's distributed dynamic capabilities through historical
analysis is therefore an important processes of rediscovering South
Africa's mineral resource history. It is also a necessary part of
building informed policy that addresses the MRFN’s institutional
legacy. However, many issues regarding the MRFN’s legacy were
beyond the scope of this analysis. These include whether there is
evidence the network's resources and capabilities became immo-
bile and thereby location specific [19]. While our cases covered
development across distinct mineral deposits, the geographic
structure of the network was not explored. We describe the net-
work's emergence and development across what now corresponds
to the boarders of modern South Africa, but its influence was felt
across southern Africa and globally. Similarly, the influence of
overseas forces, such as the dynamics of the international gold
standard, foreign financial networks and colonial ambitions were
all issues beyond the critical technology focus of this analysis. The
downstream users of the intermediate goods produced by the
MRFN, such as petro-chemicals, and steel, are also significantly
impacted indirectly by the MRFN but those implications, despite
needing to be considered in a comprehensive analysis of distrib-
uted dynamic capabilities, were also beyond the scope of the pre-
sent analysis.
Nonetheless, this analysis is an important contribution to the
reconceptualization of dynamic capabilities to analyze issues of
economic development and the management of networks. It also
raises a new perspective to better understand South Africa's his-
toriography. It demonstrates that distributed dynamic capabilities
accumulate through socially embedded and contingent historical
processes [49]. Research is clear that long run economic growth is
14 See, for example, [15,98,101].
15 We believe the conceptualization of the networked organization and distrib-
uted dynamic capabilities is an original contribution of this analysis, but it is related
to the issue of the location of organizational links being diffused and distributed
that were raised by Neil Kay that he referred to as “diffused dynamic capabilities”
[50].
16 This kind of change in economic and social contexts is described within the
distributed capabilities framework as a dialectical process that transforms the
structural environment faced by the firm [104].
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driven foremost by the ability to absorb new technology and having
an educated labor force capable of implementing and exploiting it
[16,30]. We show that a synergistic accumulation of dynamic ca-
pabilities can catalyze these factors and foster economic develop-
ment. Therefore, we believe the distributed dynamic capabilities
framework holds considerable promise for analysis of a range is-
sues beyond the strategic management focus of its namesake.
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